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frequently asked questions

Ten common misconceptions about the National Bio and Agro Defense Facility


1. Working on diseases 20 miles from Raleigh is an unusual and bad idea.

This assertion is incorrect because—   
Such laboratories are now most commonly placed in or very near to urban centers in order to take advantage of the resources, security, and collaborations such siting allows. The similar high biocontainment laboratories at Atlanta, GA and Frederick, MD are surrounded by housing and are within two miles of shopping malls, golf courses, colleges, and the like. The Centers for Disease Control (CDC) high biocontainment laboratories are about four miles from Atlanta's city center. The Frederick MD laboratories are on the outskirts of a city of 53,000, and are about 20 miles away from both Baltimore and Washington DC, closer than the NBAF would be from downtown Raleigh.

2. NBAF will be a dangerous bioweapons lab.

This assertion is incorrect because—
DHS has said from the start that this laboratory will NOT do bioweapons work. Researchers will primarily come from the USDA, and are animal disease experts.  The research will be unclassified, so we will know what kinds of work is being performed. Finally, community oversight groups will be established to provide public monitoring of activities. This is an animal and public health lab that will research some diseases and will provide critical diagnostic services for the nation. This is the same model as the CDC, except the NBAF will focus on diseases affecting both animals and humans.

There are eight diseases currently selected to be researched at the NBAF.  The list, which includes four animal-only diseases and four diseases shared by humans and animals, was announced last spring.  Since that time they have been identified at the DHS NBAF website: http://www.dhs.gov/xres/labs/gc_1181073261627.shtm. The four animal diseases for study are [1] Foot and Mouth Disease, [2] Classical and [3] African Swine Fevers, and [4] Contagious Bovine Pleuropneumonia.  The diseases shared between humans and animals (aka: zoonotic diseases) to be researched are [5] Hendra, [6] Japanese Encephalitis, [7] Nipah, and [8] Rift Valley Fever.

Agents such as Nipah and Hendra have been successfully and safely worked on at the Centers for Disease Control near downtown Atlanta for decades. In fact, the three federal high biocontainment facilities (the peer institutions to the NBAF) have had a stellar safety record: In more than 20 years they have had no worker infections, no security breaches, and no community releases.

More information on these agents and diseases is available from the following third party sources. For animal diseases: The US Animal Health Association 'Gray Book':
http://www.vet.uga.edu/vpp/gray_book02/fad/index.php

For zoonotic diseases:  The Centers for Disease Control at http://www.cdc.gov/DiseasesConditions/ .  Enter the disease name in the search box.

3. It will be on 4000 acres in Granville county.

This assertion is incorrect because—   
DHS is only looking for 30 acres. We have put forward nearly 200 acres for consideration, surrounded by the 4,035-acre NC Department of Agriculture farm.  We selected the large parcel within the farm so as to give large buffer spaces around the facility and to avoid having any impact on local private landowners.

4. It will make the area a bioterror target.

This assertion is incorrect because—    
The multiple layers of security and the fragility of the agents NBAF may contain make the faculty an exceedingly unattractive target. There are no records of any U.S. biocontainment laboratory being targeted by terrorists.The NBAF's perimeter and facility security system will be a 24/7 combination of human and technological systems that are redundant and robust. The presence of the state-operated public safety force and National Guard nearby further enhance security around the site. The small amounts of infectious agents will be contained in locked freezers, biosafety cabinets, and break resistant containers, all within the hardened high biocontainment sections of the building. If any bomb or large aircraft were able to cause sufficient damage to compromise high containment areas, the incident would spray the area with accelerants or petroleum-based fuels and result in high temperature, intense, fires that will kill any viruses and microbes within the building.

5. Plum Island?s history of accidents shows we cannot operate such a facility.

This assertion is incorrect because—      
Plum Island Animal Disease Center (PIADC) is nearly 60 years old and cannot be sufficiently renovated to meet current needs. The issues most commonly raised by opponents (such as in the book Lab 257) are at best misleading:
•    [The claim that a whistleblower had to identify leaks in the system, were actually when animals held entirely within the lab were mistakenly exposed during a training program. The local community-run PIADC advisory board felt that since it was completely in the lab and nothing outside was involved, it was not an event meeting their criteria for concern],
or just not factual: 
•    [Claims that PIADC brought Anthrax or Lyme disease, or other agents, to the Northeast are false; anthrax has never been worked on at PIADC, and Lyme was known to the Colonial era inhabitants, centuries prior to PIADC]. 

6. Workforce opportunities will not be available to local populations.

This assertion is incorrect because—   
The NBAF will employ researchers, technicians, medical technologists, clerical staff, maintenance workers, electricians, plumbers, HVAC workers, engineers, and security personnel. With the strong university and community college presence in the area, Granville county citizens should be well qualified to compete for all levels of employment.

7. The facility will put our watershed (Neuse river basin, Holt Lake, and Falls Lake) at risk.

This assertion is incorrect because—     
The proposed site is outside of 100 and 500-year flood zones. It is only slightly impacted by Neuse river buffer zones. The entire area is geologically quiet.  Natural disasters, then, pose little risk to the facility’s operations. All waste from the lab will be pretreated and decontaminated, just as has been done successfully with CDC in Atlanta for many decades. Regulations for discharge are more strict than are most municipal drinking water standards; water that comes out will be microbiologically cleaner than water it takes in. Nitrogen and phosphorus releases will be low, and can be handled with secondary water treatment should local regulations deem such treatment advisable. In more than 20 years of operation, federal high biocontainment laboratories have had NO worker infections, NO security breaches, and NO community releases.

8. Security & response capabilities are insufficient.

This assertion is incorrect because—   
On site security will be a federal charge, and will provide 24/7 human and technological security programs.  The State of NC already provides area public safety and emergency response through Butner Public Safety. If selected to host the NBAF, the state will undertake a threat/response analysis to best allocate resources to meet any special needs for detection and response well before the doors to the facility are opened.

9. Big laboratories like this will damage property values.

This assertion is incorrect because—  
The two nearest high biocontainment laboratory
facilities to North Carolina are at Frederick Maryland, and Atlanta, Georgia. The Frederick facility, as mentioned above, is on the outskirts of a medium-sized city and has housing at its borders. The September 2007 housing values for the laboratory’s zip code are approximately the same as those for Maryland in general, with a range from the mid-$200’s to over $1 million. Atlanta Georgia, home to the CDC’s high biocontainment laboratories, is one of the fastest growing and most prosperous cities in the USA (the #10 fastest growing metropolitan area in the USA). The zip code for the CDC had a September 2007 median home price above the Atlanta regional median price, with a range from the mid-$100’s to over $1 million. There is, therefore, no evidence these facilities depress land values.  It is not surprising, then, that both Georgia and Maryland put in proposals to gain the NBAF for their states. 

10. Contained populations at the local state and federal institutions will be at risk.

This assertion is incorrect because—
Since Hurricanes Fran and Floyd, all state and federal institutions have emergency response and evacuation plans in place. They will be updated to account for any additional considerations should the NBAF be sited here. These plans will be evaluated during the state-required regional analysis described in question 8.


About the National Bio and Agro-Defense Facility


What is the National Bio and Agro-Defense Facility (NBAF)?

The NBAF is a state-of-the-art biological and agricultural research facility designed to protect the country's food supply and public health. Scientists working at this facility will study diseases affecting humans and animals (also known as 'zoonotic diseases') and will develop tests and vaccines that are important to public health.

Why does the USA need something like the NBAF?

The federal government has identified the need for safe, secure, and state-of-the-art biocontainment laboratories that research and develop diagnostic capabilities for foreign animal and zoonotic diseases (i.e., diseases that affect both humans and animals).  At present there are no facilities in the United States that are adequate to meet these national needs.  To address the issue, in January 2006 the Department of Homeland Security and its federal partners initiated plans for a National Bio and Agro-Defense Facility (NBAF) that will combine efforts of researchers from the U.S. Department of Agriculture, the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, and from Homeland Security.


Federal process for the National Bio and Agro-Defense Facility site selection


What is the federal process for developing the NBAF?

In March 2006, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) received 29 applications from states interested in hosting the NBAF.  DHS announced on August 9, 2006 that the list had been narrowed to 18 potential sites representing 14 consortia.  On July 11, 2007 DHS announced the short list of five sites for further evaluation. North Carolina is on that short list. These sites will undergo an in-depth 18-24 month evaluation.  A final decision is expected to be made before the end of 2008.  Construction of the facility will take place from 2009 to 2013.

What is the current situation on NC's Consortium and its efforts?

Please go to this link for the up-to-date summary of the NBAF process history and NC's involvement:
http://www.ncc-nbaf.org/pdf/faq/OnePage_LinkFromFAQ.pdf

When is the NBAF coming to North Carolina?

It has not yet been decided where the NBAF will be located.  Currently, North Carolina is one of five Consortia being considered by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) for siting the facility.

Will the environmental impact of constructing this facility be taken into account?

We will participate in a rigorous federal environmental impact study.  This study must be successfully completed prior to the final selection of the site for the NBAF.  The results of the study will be made available to the public as part of the site selection process.   For more information on the environmental impact study process, please go to this linked PDF file  in our Technical Information section:
http://www.ncc-nbaf.org/pdf/info/Tech_EnviroImpactStudy.pdf

Will the general public be given the opportunity to comment on this proposed facility?

Yes.  A series of public hearings will be scheduled to allow the federal government to gauge public opinion in the surrounding areas for the construction of the proposed NBAF.


The National Bio and Agro-Defense Facility's benefits for NC and for US


If selected as one of the final sites, what does this mean for North Carolina's economy?

The construction and operation of the NBAF will bring tremendous economic growth to the state, including $1.65 billion in new cash flow at the state level and more than $31 million in net revenue to the local economy in its first 20 years. North Carolina will become internationally known as a result of this facility, which will attract additional research and development dollars and workforce training opportunities.

Why does the agricultural community want to see this facility built?

North Carolina's agriculture, as well as the nation's agricultural community, has much to gain from this facility because the research conducted at the NBAF will ensure solutions are developed that protect our food supply from important diseases. The work conducted and the solutions developed at the NBAF are critical to sustaining America's agricultural industry.  As a result, the NC Consortium for the NBAF includes the NC Cattlemen's Association, the NC Dairy Producers Association, the NC Pork Council, the NC Poultry Federation, the NC Farm Bureau, and the NC Agribusiness Council.

Why does the public health community want to see this facility built?

The nation's public health community, as well as that of North Carolina, recognizes the real need for a facility and researchers whose goal is to address zoonotic diseases, that is, diseases humans share with animals. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention has noted that approximately three of four new and/or emerging disease threats for humans are zoonotic. That means protecting humans requires understanding the disease in animals. The work and solutions developed at the NBAF are critical to protecting public health across the nation.

What non-economic benefits will accrue to NC should we be successful in gaining the NBAF?

Because such important work will happen at the NBAF, being selected to construct and operate the facility will bring international recognition to North Carolina and its citizens.  Additionally, it will give our public health, emergency management, and agricultural experts new opportunities for advanced training and education, thereby increasing their ability to protect us, our families, and our food supply.  Finally, the ability of NBAF personnel to diagnose disease outbreaks will better protect North Carolina's public and their animals.

Is North Carolina a good place for this facility?

North Carolina is an ideal location for this facility because of our rich offering of medical and veterinary research capabilities, our advanced biotech sector, and our rich agriculture expertise.  North Carolina is one of the nation's top agricultural states and is also a major player in the $30 billion-a-year field of biotechnology.  The creation of the NBAF will help augment N.C.'s 50-year investment in the economy of tomorrow and will serve as a magnet for private biotechnology companies, for biotechnology and health professionals, and for related support infrastructure.  Furthermore, our state's ongoing research, development, and operation of health programs involving disaster management, zoonotic diseases, and foreign animal diseases will complement and support the NBAF's missions.


Biosecure laboratory descriptions, operations, and oversight


Who will oversee and administer the day-to-day work at the facility?

The NBAF will be jointly administered by the U.S. Departments of Homeland Security, Health and Human Services, and Agriculture.  Personnel from all three agencies would work at the NBAF.

How accessible will the NBAF be to the general public?

The general public will not have access to the NBAF.

How many BSL4 labs are there and where are they located?

There are six BSL-4 capable laboratories operating in the U.S.. The federal government operates four (United States Army Medical Research Institute for Infectious Diseases at Fort Detrick in Frederick, MD; the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention in Atlanta, GA; plus the National Institutes of Health facilities in Hamilton, MT, and in Bethesda, MD [MD currently working at BSL3-only level]).  Other, non-federal, BSL-4 capable laboratories include the Southwest Foundation for Biomedical Research in San Antonio, TX and the University of Texas Medical Branch's Center for Biodefense and Emerging Infectious Diseases, in Galveston, TX.  Finally, Boston University is in planning stages to construct the National Emerging Infectious Diseases Laboratory BSL-4 facility in Massachusetts.


Safety and security issues


Should the community be worried about the type of work being done at the NBAF?

Research facilities in the U.S. similar to the NBAF have outstanding safety records: No community or environmental safety problems have occurred in the more than 20 years that these facilities have been in operation.  The workers follow strict safety procedures in the laboratories and are constantly monitored by the federal government.

What will help ensure that workers and the community are safe?

The Department of Homeland Security is expected to direct that the NBAF have biocontainment laboratories up through Biosafety Level 3 (BSL3) and  Biosafety Level 4 (BSL4).  North Carolina currently houses hundreds of BSL2 and dozens of BSL3 labs at our major universities as well as at several private companies.  The National Institutes of Health have monitored safety at federal BSL4 labs for more than 20 years and there have been no community releases or security breaches.  All such labs are carefully designed and operated, plus they and their workers undergo regular inspection and certification by the federal government.  For more information on biosecure laboratory classifications, please the Technical Information document PDF file:
http://www.ncc-nbaf.org/pdf/info/Tech_BiosafetyLevels.pdf

What about water quality issues relating to discharges from the NBAF?

In more than two decades of monitoring federal high-level biosecure facilities, there has never been an accidental release or community contamination.  The NBAF will have its own self-contained and redundant treatment system for waste water from the facility.   Depending on the source (i.e., restroom, laboratory, etc.) the effluent will undergo a series of heat and/or chemical decontamination treatments to make it safe for discharge to the local sewage treatment system.  With regards to microorganisms, because of strict federal requirements for waste treatment in biosecure facilities, any outflow from the NBAF will likely be 'cleaner' than the water it receives.  After this on-site treatment, effluent will connect to the South Granville Water and Sewer Authority's (SGWASA) waste water system that serves the site.  The current SGWASA capacity rating is more than five million gallons a day, but is using less than 50% of that volume.  It will not be appreciably impacted by the NBAF operations.

What is the danger of a release through fire or explosion at high biocontainment facilities?

The safety record of such facilities is outstanding.  For federal BSL3-4 facilities there have been no community releases or contaminations for any reason.  We are unaware of any reports of explosions in U.S.-based BSL3 or BSL4 facilities.  Fires can occur, though, since a laboratory and its support facilities contain office-typical combustibles.  Fire, and the heat from such a fire, however, will inactivate most microoganisms in high biocontainment laboratories.  Furthermore, the small quantities of biological agents in such labs are kept in freezers, refrigerators, incubators, and/or biosafety cabinets, further decreasing the chance of release during a fire.  Finally, these laboratories have state-of-the-art fire suppression systems, rapid emergency response, and effective clean-up and disinfection plans should an event occur.

Who will respond at the facility in the event of an emergency?

In the event of a fire or emergency, the proposed site is in the jurisdiction of the Butner Public Safety Division (BPS) of the NC Department of Crime Control and Public Safety.  Officers of BPS have more responsibility and more varied duties than most law enforcement officers in our state.  For instance, they are certified in both law enforcement and fire fighting, and are also required to have extensive knowledge of the policies, procedures, and special needs of the more than two dozen federal, state, and local agencies currently in their jurisdiction.  In addition, the NC Division of Emergency Management will develop a response plan for this facility with local emergency management in Granville and cooperating counties and will bring regional  assets and resources together an area-wide coordinated safety and security program for the NBAF.

Won't the NBAF be a terrorist target?

We are unaware of any such facilities being targeted by terrorist groups.  This lack of terrorist interest in high biocontainment facilities is probably because an attack would be complicated to execute and unlikely to succeed.

The concept behind high biocontainment structure design and operation, such as the the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention in Atlanta, Georgia, or the proposed NBAF, are to function like a ‘box within a box, within a box’, and are surrounded by highly secure perimeters.  What this means is that the hardened biocontainment area is, itself, protected by the highly secure surrounding structures of the overall facility.  Furthermore, within the biocontainment area, the small amounts of microorganisms will be kept inside sealed containers and those containers will themselves be in secure refrigerators, incubators, hoods, or other devices.  Lastly, microorganisms are sensitive to heat, fire, and most petroleum-based chemicals and solvents (such as those used as accelerants in bombs and arson attacks).

Therefore, should terrorists attempt to fly an airliner into, or car-bomb, a high biocontainment complex, they would first need to get beyond modern redundant high security systems.  Furthermore, most of any damage would occur in the outside sections of the facility, not the biocontainment area.  Additionally, any fire resulting from such an attack, should it get to the biocontainment rooms, will neutralize the agents.  In short, such an attack would be extremely difficult to accomplish, and it is highly improbable that it could result in release of any kind.